Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
2006, Vol. 91, No. 4, 698–711

0022-3514/06/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.91.4.698

The Paradox of Group-Based Guilt: Modes of National Identification, Conflict Vehemence, and Reactions to the In-Group's Moral Violations

Sonia Roccas
The Open University of Israel

Yechiel Klar and Ido Liviatan
Tel Aviv University

The authors examined the relationships between 2 modes of national identification (attachment to the in-group and the in-group's glorification) and reactions to the in-group's moral violations among Israeli students. Data were collected during a period of relative calm in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as well as during a period of great intensification of this conflict. As expected, in Study 1, the 2 modes of identification had contrasting relationships with group-based guilt: Attachment was positively related whereas glorification was negatively related to group-based guilt for in-group's past infractions. Glorification suppressed the attachment effect but not vice versa. Both relationships were mediated by the use of exonerating cognitions. In Study 2, group-based guilt for the in-group's current wrongdoings was increased by priming critical rather than conventional attachment to the in-group, suggesting a causal effect of mode of identification on the experience of negative group-based emotions.

Keywords: group-based guilt, national identification, moral violations

In recent years there has been increased interest in how groups conceptualize their troubled history (e.g., Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). Typical examples are post-Holocaust Germany (e.g., Michman, 2002; Niven, 2002; Rensmann, 2004); nations with a colonial past such as Belgium, Portugal, and the Netherlands; (e.g., Cohen, 2001; Doosje et al., 1998; Licata & Klein, 2004); or nations with a history of ethnic cleansing of native populations such as the United States, Canada, and Australia (e.g., Augoustinos, & LeCouteur, 2004; Barkan & Snowden, 2001). These studies have provided important insights into the ways in which group members react to information that challenges their group's morality. However, the willingness of group members to question the morality of their in-group in the context of violent ongoing and unsolved conflicts is far from being fully understood.

During an ongoing and violent conflict, people are likely to be especially reluctant to criticize the morality of their in-group. Belief in the moral superiority of the in-group and the justifiability of its actions is critical in times of conflict because it is needed to mobilize internal and external support to continue the fight. However, it is precisely during times of open conflict that there is heightened danger that the conflicting parties may engage in brutal and inhumane acts, making willingness to recognize the potential immorality of in-group actions imperative. One of the goals of the current research is to examine factors affecting the ways people react to information questioning the morality of their in-group's actions during different stages of an intense ongoing intergroup conflict.

An additional goal of this study is to disentangle a basic theoretical puzzle in group-based guilt literature: the conflicting relationships between group identification and group-based guilt. In previous research on group-based guilt, identification with the group has sometimes been characterized as the major buffer to experiencing feelings of guilt. For example, Doosje et al. (1998) argued that high identifiers experience less group-based guilt because they quickly reject the notion that their group has committed immoral deeds and can thus absolve themselves from moral distress. Subsequent results, however, have provided mixed support for this position (see Branscombe, 2004). In this article, we present a multifaceted view of national identification and test the hypothesis that different modes of identification have opposing relations to feelings of group-based guilt. We propose that identification can simultaneously increase and decrease feelings of group-based guilt, depending on the mode of identification. More specifically, we argue that attachment to the group without glorifying it is the "active ingredient" in the likelihood of experiencing group-based guilt.

In the studies reported here, we focused on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which is regarded by many as one of the most intractable contemporary intergroup conflicts (Bar-Tal, 1998; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). In the first study, we examined judgments of Jewish Israelis about moral violations perpetrated by Israelis in the context of this conflict. We examined two samples. The first sample responded in the spring of 2000, during a period of relative calm in the conflict. Unfortunately, in September 2000 there was

Sonia Roccas, Department of Psychology and Education, The Open University of Israel, Tel Aviv, Israel; Yechiel Klar and Ido Liviatan, Department of Psychology, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel.

Ido Liviatan is now at the Department of Psychology, New York University.

The work of Sonia Roccas was supported by a grant from the Solomon Asch Center for the Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict and by Israel Science Foundation Grant 785/03. The work of Yechiel Klar at the later stages of research was supported by Israel Science Foundation Grant 1211/05. We are thankful to Ilan Roziner for his help in analyzing the data and to Talia Fried and Michal Bitton for their help in designing the instruments and collecting the data.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Sonia Roccas, Department of Psychology and Education, The Open University of Israel, 16 Klausner Street, P.O.B. 39328, Ramat-Aviv, Tel Aviv 61392, Israel. E-mail: soniaro@oumail.openu.ac.il

a resurgence of open hostilities between the two parties. We decided to repeat the study and explore the effects of the resurgence of open conflict on the retrospective perception of the in-group's past moral infractions (i.e., group actions that took place long before the recent escalation). The second sample in Study 1 responded in the fall of 2001 following 1 year of intifada (Palestinian armed struggle). In Study 2 we experimentally manipulated critical attachment (i.e., attachment without glorification) and conventional attachment to assess their effects on group-based guilt for current wrongdoings.

Identification and Group-Based Guilt: A Basic Paradox

The relationship between identification with one's national group and the experience of group-based guilt presents an inherent contradiction: On the one hand, group-based guilt is by definition "guilt by association" (Doosje et al., 1998). That is, it refers to feeling guilty for deeds that a person did not commit—feelings that arise because people are associated with the perpetrators by virtue of their common group membership. To feel morally implicated in immoral acts performed by in-group members, individuals need at the very least to self-categorize as members of the perpetrating group (Branscombe et al., 2002; Doosje et al., 1998). Among people who do not evade the relevant self-categorization, those who are attached to the group should be most susceptible to group-based emotions. Thus, one may expect that individuals who are most highly identified with a group to be most likely to feel group-based guilt. Stated differently, it can be argued that individuals who do not include a group as a major component of their social identity are less likely to feel guilt over moral infractions committed by group members.[1] Thus, it can be argued that because group-based guilt is guilt by association, identification should be positively related to feeling moral guilt over the in-group's wrongdoings.

On the other hand, those who are highly identified should also be the most motivated to defend their group identity (Branscombe et al., 2002). Extensive research indicates that individuals who identify with their group tend to feel that the group is good and moral (e.g., Janis, 1982; Staub, 1997). When group members are confronted with negative information regarding their group, they often reinterpret this information in ways that protect their ability to derive a positive social identity from their group membership (Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel, & Blanz, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). According to this line of reasoning, identification with a group should lead to legitimization of the group's actions and consequently should be negatively related to people's feelings of group-based guilt.

Thus the paradox may be delineated as follows: Being identified with one's group should be associated with experiencing stronger group-based emotions and thus should be associated with feeling stronger group-based guilt. But being identified with the group should also be associated with legitimization of the group's wrongdoings and hence feeling little or no guilt.

The Unidimensional Approach to the Identification-Guilt Paradox

This identification-guilt paradox did not elude Doosje et al.'s (1998) attention. The authors suggested that in general, people who are strongly identified with their group are more likely to experience group-based emotions than are people whose identification is weak, but they qualified this claim as follows:

> Negative group-image threatening emotions, such as guilt or shame, however are likely to be experienced only by people who are willing to admit or accept that their group has done something wrong in the first place. We argue that high identifiers are typically unlikely to accept a negative interpretation of their group history and that they may have other defensive means of dealing with such a group threatening situation. (Doosje et al., 1998, p. 879)

The authors concluded that high identifiers are more likely than low identifiers to employ a variety of defensive reactions and thus are less likely to experience group-based guilt. However, there has been little support for their hypothesis that highly attached members experience less group-based guilt than their low attachment counterparts. A recent review (Branscombe, 2004) indicates that the relationship between group identification and guilt varies across studies: Identification was sometimes positively related to group-based guilt (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2004), sometimes negatively related to it (Doosje et al., 1998), and sometimes there was no overall relationship between the two variables (Branscombe, Slugoski, & Kappen, 2004).

Identification with the national group is defined in this literature as feelings of attachment to one's group (Doosje et al., 2004) and is measured with items such as "I identify with other (name of group members)," "(name of group) is an important group to me," and "Being an (name of group) is an important part of how I see myself at this moment" (Doosje et al., 1998).

We propose that the inconsistencies found in past research on the relationship of identification and group-based guilt reflect the complex effects of identification, which cannot be detected with a unidimensional approach. More specifically, we propose, in light of the identification-guilt paradox, that identification with a group simultaneously increases and decreases the propensity toward group-based guilt. To capture these complex effects, a more finely tuned approach to identification is needed. For this purpose, we base much of our analysis of the different modes of identification on the extensive theoretical and empirical studies that have focused on identification with the nation.

Dual Conceptualizations of Identification With the National Group

Theoreticians and researchers from diverse areas have distinguished two main aspects of national identification. Adorno, Frankel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) differentiated *pseudo-patriotism*, defined as "blind attachment to certain national cultural values, uncritical conformity with the prevailing group ways, and rejection of other nations as outgroups" (p. 107), from *genuine patriotism*, defined as "love of the country and attachment to national values based on critical understanding" (p. 107). Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) suggested a similar distinction be-

[1] Obviously, individuals who do not identify with the group may still feel enraged over its acts, in the same way that nonmembers may be. However they are not expected to feel much responsibility for the deeds or feel resultant guilt.

tween *nationalism,* defined as a view that one's nation is superior and should be dominant, and *patriotism*, defined as a feeling of attachment to one's nation. More recently, Staub (1997) proposed distinctions among *blind patriotism*, its conceptual opposite *constructive patriotism*, and *conventional patriotism*. Blind patriotism was defined as a rigid and inflexible attachment to one's country, characterized by unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance, and intolerance of criticism; conventional patriotism was defined simply as positive identification with and feelings of affective attachment to one's nation (Schatz & Staub, 1997); and constructive patriotism was defined as attachment to one's country characterized by *critical loyalty* that includes "questioning and criticism of current group practices that are driven by a desire for positive change" (Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999, p. 153).

A similar distinction can also be found in literature dealing with individual-level collectivism. Triandis (1995) described collectivism as

> a social pattern consisting of closely linked individuals who see themselves as parts of one or more collectives (family, co-workers, tribe, nation); are primarily motivated by the norms of, and duties imposed by, those collectives; are willing to give priority to the goals of these collectives over their own personal goals; and emphasize their connectedness to the members of these collectives. (p. 2)

Triandis and Gelfand (1998) suggested distinguishing two types of collectivism. *Horizontal collectivists* see themselves as similar to others and emphasize common goals, interdependence, and sociability but do not emphasize submitting to authority. *Vertical collectivists* "emphasize the integrity of the ingroup, are willing to sacrifice their personal goals for the sake of ingroup goals, and support competitions of their ingroup with outgroups" (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998, p. 119).

Glorification of the National Group and Attachment to the National Group

We suggest that Adorno et al.'s (1950) pseudo patriotism, Kosterman and Feshbach's (1989) nationalism, Staub's (1997) blind patriotism, and Triandis and Gelfand's (1998) vertical collectivism all express one mode of group identification (see also Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, & Eidelson, 2006). We refer to this as *glorification* of the national group. Glorification is thus defined as viewing the national in-group as superior to other groups and having a feeling of respect for the central symbols of the group such as its flag, rules, and leadership. An individual who is highly identified in this sense believes that the in-group is better and more worthy than other groups and that group members should adhere to all the group's rules and regulations and feels insulted if others do not show the utmost respect for the group's symbols (Roccas et al., 2006).

Similarly, we reason that Adorno et al.'s (1950) genuine patriotism, Kosterman and Feshbach's (1989) patriotism, Staub's (1997) conventional patriotism, and Triandis and Gelfand's (1998) horizontal collectivism all express another mode of group identification. We refer to this as *attachment* to the national group. People who are highly identified in this sense define themselves in terms of their group membership and extend their self-concept to include the group. They feel emotionally attached to the group and want to contribute to it (Roccas et al., 2006). As already mentioned, attachment to the national group was captured in the identification items that were used in the studies examining group-based guilt reviewed above (Branscombe, 2004; Doosje et al., 1998, 2004).

Glorification and Attachment Partly Overlap

How do glorification and attachment relate to each other? The two modes of identification should be positively related because they both tap the common concept of identification with a group. Thus people who are strongly attached to their in-group should also tend to glorify it. The positive link between attachment and glorification is supported by studies that have found moderate positive relations between patriotism and nationalism (e.g., Karasawa, 2002; Li & Brewer, 2004) and between horizontal and vertical collectivism (Chiou, 2001).

Note, however, that the two modes of identification are distinct from each other. Thus, it is possible to glorify the group without being particularly attached to it and it is possible to be attached to the group without necessarily glorifying every aspect related to the group. The latter mode of identification is of particular interest to us: It denotes a positive attachment to the group coupled with a critical approach to its possible shortcomings. In the terminology proposed by Staub (1989), people who complement their high affective attachment to their nation with low glorification are critical loyalists.

Glorification, Attachment, and Reactions to the In-Groups' Moral Infractions

We suggest that distinguishing between the two modes of national identification may be the first step in resolving the paradox of identification and group-based guilt. Glorification of the national group involves the motivation to view the group in the best possible light. Inherent to this mode of identification is justification of the group's acts and denial of any criticism toward the group (e.g. Staub, 1997). Thus, high glorifiers are likely to reject information that implies that the in-group has been involved in moral violations. In summary, high glorifiers are expected to react in the way hypothesized by Doosje et al. (1998) as characterizing all high identifiers.

Attachment to the group expresses commitment to the group and inclusion of the group in one's self-concept. This makes people who are strongly attached to their in-group particularly vulnerable to feeling morally responsible and distressed when exposed to possibly incriminating information on the group's infractions.

The predicted positive relations between attachment and group-based guilt, however, might be eliminated by positive relations between attachment and glorification. Glorification may suppress these relations, with a net result of inconsistent relations between attachment to the national group and group-based guilt, as indeed has been found in the collective guilt literature. To reveal the predicted positive relations between attachment and group-based guilt, we need to control for the glorification effect. To reiterate, we predict that it is those who are attached to the nation without glorifying it who are the most susceptible to feelings of group-based guilt.

Modes of Identification, Exonerating Cognitions, and Group-Based Guilt

It is likely that relationships between attachment, glorification, and group-based guilt are affected by the way in which information regarding the in-group is attended to and interpreted. People are distressed when they perceive that their in-group deviates from group-level moral standards (e.g., Bizman, Yinon, & Krotman, 2001), and they employ creative cognitive mechanisms to protect their positive group identity. For example, people attempt to lower the severity of their group's wrongdoings (Branscombe & Miron, 2004), they change the content of in-group and out-group stereotypes to justify discriminating an out-group (Rutland & Brown, 2001), and use external circumstances to explain negative historical actions carried out by their in-group to a greater extent than for similar actions committed by other nations (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003).

Bandura (1999) systematically analyzed the multiple ways in which such mechanisms can lead to justification of wrongdoings. People can dispute the accuracy of the reports of harm done to the out-group, displace the responsibility for the harm done and attribute the offending behaviors to extenuating external circumstances rather than volition, or even interpret the event in a manner that assigns ultimate blame to the victims themselves (see Herbert & Dunkel-Schetter, 1992, for an example of the latter mechanism). All these mechanisms enable moral disengagement and have been related to support for military intervention against an enemy (Grussendorf, McAlister, Sandstrom, Udd, & Morrison, 2002; McAlister, 2001).

In our study we focus on exonerating cognitions that minimize the perceived severity of moral violations committed by the in-group. Past research indicates that using this legitimization strategy can decrease group-based guilt (Branscombe & Miron, 2004). How should glorification and attachment to the group be related to the use of exonerating cognitions? The relations between glorification and the use of such defensive cognitions seem rather straightforward. High glorifiers are likely to reject any negative interpretation of their in-group's past deeds. Thus, glorification of the national group should be positively related to the use of exonerating cognitions.

Admittedly, the relations between attachment to the group and the use of exonerating cognitions are less easily theoretically discerned. We, nevertheless, propose that attachment to the group (when glorification is controlled for) is negatively rather than positively related to the use of exonerating cognitions. Our reasoning relies on two lines of theory and research. First, we reason that being attached to the group and categorizing the self in terms of group membership implies high involvement in processing information about the group's actions. Extensive research indicates that when people are involved in an issue, they process information more in depth, and the quality of information becomes a more important determinant of their attitudes (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1990). When the information is credible (as is the case in the current studies, in which true historical events are depicted) highly attached members may find themselves glued to the story more than their less attached counterparts. Furthermore, because of the perceived credibility of the story, it would be difficult to easily dismiss the events as false. Second, following Staub (1989), we reason that high attachment coupled with low glorification, which we have termed *critical attachment*, makes dismissal of negative information about the group unlikely. In conclusion, we suggest that attachment to the group (when glorification is controlled for) is negatively rather than positively associated with the use of exonerating cognitions.

Study 1

We tested our model in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which is rife with fierce violence by both parties. The study was conducted in two stages. The first sample was collected in a relatively calm period in the history of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (January–April 2000), when many Israelis believed that the conflict was progressing toward a peaceful solution. Unfortunately, several months later, following the failed Camp David summit in the summer of 2000 and the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada in October 2000, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict entered a new era of escalating and retaliatory violence that has claimed many lives on both sides. The belief in the resolvability of the conflict suffered a major blow.[2] We thought that it would be worthwhile to examine the effects of the "back to conflict" atmosphere that took place following the continuation of the 2000 intifada on the retrospective assessments of the same past harmful in-group actions investigated in the first sample. Specifically, we sought to test whether the willingness to assume moral responsibility for a group's past wrongdoing and experience group-based guilt was limited to circumstances in which the conflict was heading toward resolution. We explored these issues by replicating our study in the winter of 2001 (between October and December), 12+ months into the al-Aqsa Intifada.

A major theoretical tenet in most psychological theories of intergroup conflict is that a perceived threat to the in-group (imaginary or real) leads to hardening of its positions toward the out-group (for a recent review, see Stephan & Renfro, 2002). For example, some studies have revealed that outbreaks of hostilities coincide with the adoption of more negative stereotypes toward the out-group (e.g., Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Hayes, 1992) and that in-group conflict heightens current negative stereotypes and dehumanization of the enemy (Opotow, 1990; Staub, 1989). Thus, in Study 1 we examined how the intensification of the conflict affected identification, use of exonerating cognitions, and group-based guilt. We then tested our theoretical model depicting the relationships between glorification of the national group, attachment to it, use of exonerating cognitions, and feelings of group-based guilt.

[2] The change in the Israeli public in viewing the chances for a peaceful solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict between the period in which we collected the first and the second sample is reflected in the *Oslo Index*, a monthly public opinion survey conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research in Tel Aviv University. This index, which measures support for the Oslo process and belief in its positive conclusion, ranging from 100 (*full support*) to 0 (*complete rejection*), was 55 between January and April of 2000 when Study 1 was conducted and dropped to 32 between June and September of 2001 when Study 2 was conducted. The Oslo Index can be found at http://spirit.tau.ac.il/socant/peace/.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Participants were two samples of Jewish Israeli students. Data in Sample 1 ($N = 216$; 64% women, 36% men; age range = 19–39, $M = 23$) were collected during a period of relative calm in the history of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (January–April 2000). Data in Sample 2 ($N = 165$; 49% women, 51% men; age range = 18–34, $M = 23$) were collected in late 2001, about a year after a renewal of hostilities between Israelis and Palestinians.

Participants in both samples were approached at the end of class time and asked whether they would like to participate in the study for course credit or for a small payment (approximately $5). They completed the measures in groups of 20–40. The students were informed that participation in the study was voluntary and completely anonymous. Questionnaire completion took about 20 min. In Sample 2, the order of the identification, guilt, and exonerating cognition questionnaires was counterbalanced. Questionnaire order did not significantly affect means or correlations between the measures.

Instruments

Participants received a booklet containing measures of identification with the national group (Israel), group-based guilt, and background questions.[3]

Identification with the national group. Eight items measured attachment to the national group and eight items measured glorification of the national group (see the Appendix). Respondents indicated their agreement with each of the items on a 7-point scale ranging from *strongly disagree* (1) to *strongly agree* (7). Sample items for attachment are "Being Israeli is an important part of my identity" and "I am strongly committed to my nation" (Cronbach's $\alpha = .89$). Sample items for glorification are "Israel is better than other nations in all respects" and "One of the important things that we have to teach children is to respect our national leaders" (Cronbach's $\alpha = .78$).

The distinction between items measuring the two modes of identification was verified with a confirmatory factor analysis using maximum likelihood estimation. The eight attachment and eight glorification items were postulated to load on different latent factors. The analysis was conducted on this sample along with additional samples from Israel and from the United States. In both cultural groups the two-factor model of identification with the nation yielded adequate fit indices: $\chi^2(103, N = 484) = 374.323$, comparative fit index (CFI) = .93, in the American sample; $\chi^2(206, N = 208) = 726.37$, CFI = .87, in the Israeli sample (Roccas et al., 2006).[4]

Group-based guilt and exonerating cognitions. Participants read accounts of three historical events depicting harm done by Israelis to Palestinians. The events were presented in a factual paragraph indicating clearly that the harm resulted from an intentional act, without any explicit condemnation. Following is one of these events:

> On 29 October, 1956, with the opening of Operation Kadesh [the 1956 war between Israel and Egypt], a curfew was imposed in the Arab villages in the "triangle," among these Kafir Kasem. The border patrol forces were responsible for enforcing the curfew in Kafir Kasem. The operational command that was given on that day stated that anyone disobeying the curfew should be shot with the aim to kill. The leader of the border patrol unit asked the commander of the decree what to do in the case of field workers who were unaware of the curfew and had not heard about it in the meantime. The commander replied in Arabic, "Allah yerachmo" [may God have mercy on them]. In a series of orders, the leader of the border patrol unit clarified that Arabs sitting in their homes were not to be injured, but that any person found outside of their home was to be shot dead. He said, "If there are a few casualties, it will only make enforcing the curfew easier in the coming days." Towards evening, when the residents of the village returned home from their jobs, they were stopped, lined up, and shot by the border patrol soldiers. 43 Arab residents were killed, among them 7 children and 9 women.

The two other historical events were the forced evacuation of Palestinians from the cities of Ramleh and Lidya (Lod) during the 1948 war and the 1994 killing of 29 Arab worshippers in the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron by Baruch Goldstein, a Jewish settler from the West Bank. None of our participants had any personal involvement in any of the three historical events depicted in the studies—the earliest having taken place 52 years prior to the study and the most recent 6 years prior to it. Thus, these three events were part of the group histories of the participants rather than being part of their own personal history.

Participants read the accounts of all three events. Then each account was presented again followed by a series of items on a 7-point scale ranging from *do not agree at all* (1) to *completely agree* (7). These items were used to construct the scales for exonerating cognitions and group-based guilt; each scale was the average of scores on its constituent items over the three events. By presenting participants with all three accounts before assessing their responses, we sought to minimize the effects of order and provide all participants with the same contextual anchoring.

Exonerating cognitions. Seven items measured the use of exonerating cognitions in response to each of the three events. Sample items are "In my opinion, the description of the event is too harsh concerning the Israelis"; "Even if the event really happened the way it is described here, it pales in comparison to what the Arabs would have done to the Israeli side"; and "In my opinion, the Arabs brought the event upon themselves" (Cronbach's $\alpha = .92$).

Group-based guilt. Seven items measured willingness to assume moral responsibility for the harm done in response to each of the three events. Following previous research on group-based guilt (Doosje et al. 1998), we included items in our measure that tapped feelings of guilt directly and items measuring a more behavioral manifestation of guilt—willingness to compensate the victims. Sample items are "I feel guilty about what happened in the event depicted" and "I feel that as a result of the event depicted, I should help to improve the situation of Arabs" (Cronbach's $\alpha = .94$).

Results

Intensification of the Conflict, Modes of Identification, Exonerating Cognitions, and Group-Based Guilt

Before testing the hypotheses regarding the relationships of different modes of identification with exonerating cognitions and group-based guilt, we examined whether the intensification of the conflict that occurred in the period between the times we collected responses from the two samples affected our core variables. Means of glorification, attachment, exonerating cognitions, and guilt in the low conflict phase (Sample 1) and high conflict phase (Sample 2) are presented in Table 1. The effects of the intensity of the conflict were tested with a multivariate analysis of variance, with the time of measurement (low conflict in early 2000 and high conflict in winter 2001) as the between-participants' variable. This analysis revealed a multivariate significant main effect, $F(1, 376) = 5.58$, $p < .001$. At the univariate level, the effect was significant for group-based guilt, $F(1, 379) = 9.53$, $p < .005$, and

[3] A total of 107 participants also reported their personal value priorities.

[4] In both cultural groups, the fit indices of the two-factor model were better than those resulting from a single-factor model and somewhat worse than those resulting from a four-factor model that included finer distinctions within glorification and attachment not relevant to the present study.

Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Attachment, Glorification, Exonerating Cognitions, and Collective Guilt in the Low and High Conflict Samples

	Low conflict sample		High conflict sample	
Variable	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Attachment	5.42	1.07	5.25	1.07
Glorification	3.45	0.91	3.39	1.00
Exonerating cognitions	2.59	0.90	2.94	0.95
Collective guilt	4.29	1.21	3.90	1.24

for the use of exonerating cognitions $F(1, 379) = 13.02$, $p < .001$. As expected, participants in the high conflict phase reported lower levels of guilt compared with participants in the low conflict phase (high conflict: $M = 3.90$; low conflict: $M = 4.29$), and they made greater use of exonerating cognitions (high conflict: $M = 2.94$; low conflict: $M = 2.59$). There were no differences in attachment and glorification, $F(1, 379) = 2.37$, and $F(1, 379) = .37$, respectively, $ps > .10$.

Relations Between Glorification, Attachment, Exonerating Cognitions, and Group-Based Guilt

The first step in studying the relations between glorification, attachment, and group-based guilt was exploring the zero-order correlations between these variables. Consistent with the notion that glorification of the group and attachment to the group partly overlap, these two concepts were positively related in both samples ($rs = .57$ and $.52$, $ps < .001$, in Samples 1 and 2, respectively). Also, as predicted, glorification was negatively correlated to group-based guilt ($rs = -.45$ and $-.54$, $ps < .01$, in Samples 1 and 2, respectively), whereas attachment was not correlated to guilt ($rs = .09$ and $.03$, *ns*, in Samples 1 and 2, respectively). Consistently, glorification was positively related to exonerating cognitions ($rs = .46$ and $.52$, $p < .001$, in Samples 1 and 2, respectively), whereas the correlations of attachment with exonerating cognitions were near zero ($r = .14$, $p < .05$, in Sample 1; $r = .13$, *ns*, in Sample 2).

To test our model in full, we conducted a structural equation modeling (SEM) analysis using EQS Version 6 (Bentler, 2002), combining results of the two samples (see Figure 1). Each of the latent variables (attachment, glorification, exonerating cognitions, and group-based guilt) had two indicators. The two indicators were computed by splitting the items related to each latent variable into two sets: even versus odd numbered items. The structural model fitted the data well, $\chi^2(14, N = 381) = 43.35$, $p < .001$, CFI = .98, normed fit index (NFI) = .98, nonnormed fit index (NNFI) = .97, standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR) = .033. The independent variables explained 25% of the variance in group-based guilt.

Consistent with hypotheses, the path from glorification to exonerating cognitions was positive ($\beta = .74$, $p < .05$), the path from attachment to exonerating cognitions was negative ($\beta = -.39$, $p < .05$), and the path from exonerating cognitions to guilt was negative ($\beta = -.41$, $p < .05$). Indirect (mediated by the exonerating cognitions) effects of both glorification and attachment on guilt were significant ($p < .05$). The direct path (unmediated by the exonerating cognitions) from attachment to guilt was positive ($\beta = .25$, $p < .05$). The direct path from glorification to guilt was nonsignificant ($\beta = -.19$), indicating complete mediation by the exonerating cognitions. All in all, the SEM results corroborated the theoretical model.[5]

Next, we conducted a series of analyses to examine finer points. We took a deeper look at our measure of group-based guilt and examined its emotional and behavioral components separately. As already indicated, following Doosje et al. (1998), we used a compound measure of group-based guilt that included items that directly tapped emotion and items that tapped the behavioral manifestation of guilt: willingness to compensate the victims. Past research indicates that feelings of guilt are closely related to willingness to compensate the victims. For example, Iyer, Leach, and Crosby (2003) found that among White people, feelings of guilt over racial discrimination and White privilege were related to support of policies designed to compensate African Americans. Similarly, in our sample, the emotional manifestation and the behavioral manifestation of guilt were highly correlated ($r = .77$). However, the emotional and the behavioral manifestations of guilt are theoretically distinguishable. We therefore sought to examine whether they were similarly related to exonerating cognitions, attachment, and glorification.

We repeated the SEM analyses for each manifestation of guilt separately. The results were very similar across the two measures.

Emotional guilt. The model fitted well to the data, $\chi^2(14, N = 381) = 34.25$, $p < .002$, CFI = .99, NFI = .98, NNFI = .97, SRMR = .031. The independent variables in the model explained 33% of the variance in group-based guilt. The path from glorification to exonerating cognitions was positive ($\beta = .89$, $p < .05$), the path from attachment to exonerating cognitions was negative ($\beta = -.47$, $p < .05$), and the path from exonerating cognitions to guilt was negative ($\beta = -.56$, $p < .05$). Indirect (mediated by the exonerating cognitions) effects of both glorification and attachments on guilt were significant ($ps < .05$). The direct path (unmediated by the exonerating cognitions) from attachment to guilt was positive ($\beta = .21$, $p < .05$). The direct path from glorification to guilt was near zero ($\beta = -.02$), indicating complete mediation by the exonerating cognitions.

Behavioral guilt. The model fitted well to the data, $\chi^2(14, N = 381) = 57.47$, $p < .001$, resulting in the following fit indices, CFI = .97, NFI = .97, NNFI = .95, SRMR = .048. The model explained 31% of the variance in group-based guilt. The path from glorification to exonerating cognitions was positive ($\beta = .87$, $p < .05$), the path from attachment to exonerating cognitions was negative ($\beta = -.47$, $p < .05$), and the path from exonerating cognitions to guilt was negative ($\beta = -.56$, $p < .05$). Indirect (mediated by the exonerating cognitions) effects of both glorification and attachment on guilt were significant ($ps < .05$). The direct

[5] We examined the relationships between attachment, glorification, exonerating cognitions, and guilt separately in the two samples with hierarchical regressions. Results were very consistent across the two samples. Thus, the two modes of identification were similarly related to exonerating cognitions and to group-based guilt despite the changes in sociopolitical context.



Figure 1. Structural equation model of the relationships of attachment, glorification, exonerating cognitions, and group-based guilt (standardized parameter estimates). Solid lines represent statistically significant paths ($p < .05$). The dotted line represents a path that is not statistically significant. Measured indicators and their errors are not shown. Both R^2 coefficients are statistically significant at $p < .05$.

paths (unmediated by the exonerating cognitions) from attachment to guilt and from glorification to guilt were near zero (βs = .03 and −.01, respectively), indicating complete mediation by the exonerating cognitions. In summary, the relationships between the two modes of identification, exonerating cognitions, and group-based guilt were consistent across the emotional and behavioral manifestations of guilt.

Discussion

Effects of Conflict Intensification on Perception of Historical Events

The resurgence of conflict brought with it some defensive revisions in the assessment of the in-group's past wrongdoings. In our study, participants reacted to events that had occurred long ago: the most remote 52 years and the most recent 6 years before the first study. Nonetheless, the resurgence of violence apparently affected perceptions of these past events. These results suggest that in periods of heightened conflict, not only are group members likely to justify in-group acts that would be deemed unjustifiable in periods of relative calm, but they are also more likely to withhold moral condemnation of harmful acts committed by the in-group in the past.

The high match between the two cohorts used in the studies, both taken from the same participant pool, makes any attribution of the results in terms of possible differences between the two samples rather unlikely. More probable explanations are that the decrease in group-based guilt and the increase in exonerating cognitions reflect some real temporal changes due to the intensification of the conflict. There are several possible mediating mechanisms that could explain how intensification of the conflict causes a decrease in group-based guilt. For example, conflict may lead people to focus on the in-group and its needs rather than on the out-group's anguish, or it may lead to a reassessment of the history of the conflict in the light of current events. Further research is needed to test these possible mediating mechanisms.

The Two Modes of Identification With the Group, Exonerating Cognitions, and Group-Based Guilt

Study 1 was set up to explore the paradoxical relations between identification with the national group and the extent of group-based guilt. We used a two-mode conceptualization of identification in which identification with the national group is composed of glorification of the national group and attachment to it, two partially overlapping tendencies. We found that these two modes of identification were indeed positively related with each other. We also found that glorification of the national group was positively associated with the use of exonerating cognitions and negatively associated with experiencing group-based guilt. Attachment to the national group, however, showed a different pattern of results. Before controlling for glorification (i.e., in the zero-order correlations), attachment was positively related to the use of exonerating cognitions and unrelated to group-based guilt. But when glorification was controlled for (in the SEM analyses), attachment switched to become negatively related to exonerating cognitions and positively related to group-based guilt. Thus being attached to the national group (when glorification is controlled for) increases rather than decreases group-based guilt.

Similarly, high attachment, when separated from glorification, is negatively associated with the use of exonerating cognitions, and the positive link between attachment and guilt is at least partly mediated by the failure to use exonerating cognitions. In summary, separating attachment from glorification served to reveal the effects of critical attachment. Drawing on Staub (1997) and on Petty and Cacioppo (1990), we reason that people who are critically attached to the group do not endorse exonerating cognitions and consequently are likely to feel guilty for the group's wrongdoings. In Study 2 we examined more closely the distinction between critical and conventional attachment to the group.

What about the direction of causality? Does the reaction to the in-group's past moral violations determine the level of identification with the group rather than the other way around as argued in this article? Obviously, this direction of causality, in its broader sense, cannot be denied. There are historical examples of individuals who completely cut off their ties with their group in response to their group's wrongdoings. In this case, group-based guilt reduces identification with the group. There are, however, a number of reasons to conclude that the current results cannot properly be explained by the "group-based guilt drives nonidentification" direction. First, reversing the causal direction between group-based guilt and the two measures of identification would require explaining how increased group-based guilt simultaneously decreases and increases identification with the group. More specifi-

cally, it would have to both decrease glorification of the group (which makes theoretical sense) but also, at the same time, increase attachment to the group (which makes less theoretical sense). Similarly, reversing the causal direction would require explaining how the use of exonerating cognitions both increases glorification of the group (which makes theoretical sense) but also decreases attachment to the group (which makes less theoretical sense). Second, reversing the causal direction makes it difficult to explain the temporal pattern of results found in the two samples. As already discussed, we found that group-based guilt regarding past wrongdoings declined from the first (low conflict) to the second (high conflict) sample; however, levels of glorification and attachment were unchanged. This lack of change is also inconsistent with a direction of causality in which a decrease in group-based guilt would result in increased identification with the group. Nonetheless, an experimental study might be appropriate to further test the causal path from identification to guilt.

Study 2

Of particular interest in our studies is the notion of *critical attachment*—attachment with relatively low-level glorification. In Study 1, we captured this conjunction by statistically controlling for glorification when examining the relationship between attachment and group-based guilt. In these studies, the zero-order correlation of attachment to guilt was nearly zero. The correlation of attachment to group-based guilt became positive only after glorification was controlled for. This is consistent with our reasoning that critical attachment is positively related to group-based guilt.

In Study 2 we adopted an experimental approach to further examine this issue. Teasing apart the effects of attachment and glorification poses a methodological challenge. The two modes of identification are conceptually similar (both refer to identification with a group) and empirically positively correlated. Thus, a manipulation that elicits one mode of identification is likely to elicit the other mode as well. Because glorification suppresses the effects of attachment on identification, a manipulation that elicits attachment and glorification simultaneously would be powerless to test our core hypothesis that attachment without glorification causes group-based guilt.

We thus sought to induce critical attachment directly and to compare its effects on group-based guilt with those of induction of *conventional attachment* (attachment intermixed with glorification). As already noted, Schatz et al. (1999) described constructive patriotism (i.e., critical attachment) as the individual's readiness to "criticize and even actively oppose the nation's action because he or she believes they violate fundamental national percepts that are contrary to long-term national interests" (p. 153). Conventional patriotism (i.e., conventional attachment), on the other hand, has been described by Schatz et al. simply as a feeling of affective attachment to the nation.

Thus, a shift from a state of mind of conventional attachment to that of critical attachment should be followed by an increased readiness to criticize the actions of one's nation that are perceived as a violation the nation's long-term interests and fundamental values, and consequently by increased susceptibility to feelings of group-based guilt. The question is, however, how these two distinct modes of attachment can be induced in the laboratory.

To approach this goal, we were conceptually assisted by the distinction in self-concept literature between how people currently conceive themselves and how they wish to conceive themselves, that is, between the *actual* and the *ideal* self (Higgins, 1989). In a similar vein, when group members think about their attachment to their nation, they can mentally focus on attributes of their nation "as it is" or on the attributes of the nation as they "ideally would like it to be." Research in the personal domain demonstrates that focusing on ideal self-guides may foster awareness of shortcomings of the individual's current self and this may lead to personal distress and a desire to self-improve (Higgins, 1989, 1999). Discrepancies between current and ideal representations of one's in-group have not been examined extensively. A notable exception is Bizman et al.'s (2001) research that indicates that people are more distressed the greater the extent to which they perceive their in-group to differ from their ideal image. We suggest that when the target of attachment is the nation as it ideally should be rather than the nation as it currently is, awareness of the nation's current moral inadequacies and resultant group-based guilt should be higher. The first goal of Study 2 was to test this prediction.

The second goal was to test these predictions in the context of the group's current actions and policies. In Study 1, participants were asked to react to past events from the chronicles of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, after being explicitly reminded about these events. In Study 2, we were interested in reactions to a more contemporary issue: the treatment of Israeli Arab citizens of Israel. Studying moral reactions to the in-group's current rather than past wrongdoings is important because these current issues may lead to relevant social action.

About 20% of Israeli citizens are Arabs (Palestinians). The treatment of this minority by the dominant Jewish majority raises many thorny issues of individual and collective rights. It is often argued that Israeli Arabs are discriminated against in many areas, such as land dispossession and allocations, education, employment, and political participation. Poverty and unemployment are substantially higher among members of this group than among the Jewish majority. Moreover, Israeli Arabs are often treated with suspicion and hostility by many majority members and viewed as being disloyal and antagonistic to the State of Israel (for discussions of these issues see, e.g., Ganim & Ghanem, 2001; Landau, 1993; Rouhana, 1998). We tested the hypothesis that thinking of the attachment to the in-group as it ideally should be leads participants to increase group-based guilt about in-group transgressions as compared with simply thinking about attachment to the in-group as it is.

Method

Participants were Jewish Israeli students ($N = 89$; 80% women, 20% men; age range = 20–35, $M = 24$) taking part in the study for course credit. They were randomly assigned to one of two groups: conventional and critical attachment.

Instruments

Participants received a booklet containing the experimental manipulation followed by a measure of group-based guilt and background questions.

Manipulation

In both conditions participants were asked to list attributes of the Israeli in-group. In the conventional attachment (actual in-group) condition the

instructions were designed to heighten the salience of those characteristics of Israel that participants view as determining their attachment to it. We used the following instructions: "Please briefly describe the attributes of Israel that prompt you to agree with the following sentence: 'I love Israel and viewing myself as Israeli is important to me.'"

In the critical attachment (ideal in-group) condition, participants were again instructed to list characteristics of Israel. But this time the phrasing of the instructions was designed to heighten the saliency of their conception of the ideal Israel: "Please briefly describe the attributes you would like to find in Israel in order to agree with the following sentence: 'I love Israel and viewing myself as Israeli is important to me.'"

Note that the tasks in the two experimental conditions were very similar: Participants listed those characteristics of Israel they associated with their attachment. The two statements used in both conditions ("I love Israel" and "viewing myself as an Israeli is important to me") were taken from the attachment scale used in Studies 1 and 2. However, the two experimental conditions differed in their focus: In the conventional attachment condition, participants focused on the actual attributes of Israel; in the critical attachment condition, participants focused on desired or ideal attributes of Israel. In both cases we expected that participants would list positive attributes of the Israeli group, but we expected these attributes to be different in content and to refer to the actual group in the former condition and to the ideal group in the latter condition. To ascertain that thinking about one's attachment to the ideal image of Israel lowers glorification, we examined the responses of 30 additional students who completed either the ideal (critical attachment) or the actual (conventional attachment) versions of the task and then completed the measure of glorification. Participants in the ideal condition ($M = 3.27$, $SD = 0.58$) expressed less glorification than those in the conventional attachment condition ($M = 4.15$, $SD = 0.65$), $t(28) = 3.94$, $p < .005$, confirming the effectiveness of the manipulation.

Group-Based Guilt

Ten items measured feelings of guilt for harm done to the Arab minority in Israel. Sample items are "I believe that Israel treats the Arab minority unjustly," "I believe that Israel should compensate Arabs citizens," and "I feel guilty when I hear on the news about the bad conditions of Arab citizens" (Cronbach's $\alpha = .89$). Given that issues related to the treatment of the Arab minority in Israel are often on the public agenda, we thought that unlike in our previous studies that dealt with the past, it would be unnecessary to provide our participants with any factual information about this matter.

Results and Discussion

The Group Attributes Engendered in the Two Experimental Conditions

We first analyzed the contents of the group attributes associated with attachment to Israel in the two experimental conditions. This was done to test whether the ideal versus actual manipulation produced two distinct sets of group attributes. Overall, participants wrote 191 different attributes. Two coders, blind to the experimental condition under which the attribute originated and to the research hypotheses, independently derived content categories from the list. Agreement between the two coders was 94%. As can be seen in Table 2, there was almost no overlap between the attributes mentioned by participants in the two experimental conditions. Participants in the conventional attachment condition portrayed their image of the current attributes of their group. They mentioned positive attributes such as in-group solidarity, geography and folklore, and Judaism. These attributes are related to the perceived meaning and traits of being an Israeli. Those in the critical attachment condition were prompted to list the attributes in which the current image of their in-group is discrepant from the ideal image. They mentioned ideal–actual discrepancies in areas such as interpersonal relations, welfare state, quality of governance, and peace and security. These discrepancies are related to hopes and desires for a better society in which the welfare of all is taken into account.

Group-Based Guilt in the Two Experimental Conditions

To test the hypothesis that priming critical attachment induces stronger group-based guilt than priming conventional attachment, we compared the mean level of group-based guilt associated with Israel's current treatment of its Arab minority in the two groups. As predicted, the mean score of group-based guilt was significantly higher in the critical attachment condition ($M = 3.57$, $SD = 0.78$) than in the conventional attachment condition ($M = 3.24$, $SD = 0.74$), $t(87) = 2.05$, $p < .05$.

The results of Study 2 provide some insight into how critical attachment enhances group-based guilt: Contemplating attachment

Table 2
Attributes of Israel Mentioned by Participants in the Conventional and Critical Attachment Experimental Conditions

Conventional attachment			Critical attachment		
Category	No. of mentions	Example attributes	Category	No. of mentions	Example attributes
Solidarity	13	Solidarity in hard times; people care for each other	Quality of governance	15	Clean government; truthful government
Positive attributes of Israelis	20	People are warm; people are open-minded	Peace	16	Peace with our neighbors; ending the occupation
Geography and folklore	18	Good food and warm weather; East and West are intermixed	Welfare state	18	A socioeconomic system that takes care of everybody; a health system
Links to Judaism[a]	33	The only Jewish state; Jewish heritage	Social justice[a]	30	Care for minorities; equal rights
			Positive interpersonal relations	10	More politeness; more civility

Note. Ten attributes in the conventional attachment condition and 15 in the critical attachment condition did not correspond to any of the listed categories.
[a] An attribute in this category was also mentioned once in the other experimental condition.

to the in-group as it ideally should be brings to mind "group basic values," "basic human values," and "group interests in the long run" (Staub, 1997, p. 214). In fact, our critical attachment participants mainly listed long-term group goals and values such as social justice, equality, peace, and quality of governance. These abstract long-term goals express universalistic values and interest in the welfare of all people (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). Thus, long-term universalistic goals became more salient for participants in the critical attachment condition than for those in the conventional attachment condition. Subsequently, when asked about the possibility that their group is treating members of an internal minority group unfairly, actions which violate universalistic goals, critical attachment participants were more inclined to experience moral distress than were conventional attachment participants. Stated differently, critical attachment to the group can be regarded as *moral attachment*.

It is noteworthy that the "ideal group" manipulation affected group-based guilt without any explicit appeal to criticize the group's current actions. Both critical and conventional attachment participants listed positive attributes of their national group. However, mere contemplation of the ideal (rather than actual) group as the target of attachment raised group-based moral responsibility.

These findings may have practical implications for persuasive attempts intended to encourage people to oppose moral violations committed by their group, especially at times of open and violent intergroup conflict. Often group members who criticize their group's actions are seen as being disloyal to the group, and consequently, their criticism is dismissed or is not influential. It follows that instead of directly criticizing the group's behaviors, persuasive attempts can encourage group members to view their attachment to their group in terms of its fundamental long-term goals and values.

General Discussion

In these two studies we sought to achieve a better understanding of group-based guilt in the context of an ongoing violent conflict. Study 1 was conducted during two phases of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict: a period of relative calm and a period of violent escalation. For both these times we examined reactions to information indicating that the in-group had harmed members of another group, enabling us to explore the effects of intensification of the conflict. In both periods participants expressed moral condemnation of the in-group's past wrongdoings. The intensity of the conflict, however, had a clear effect: Endorsement of cognitions exonerating the in-group was higher and group-based guilt was lower in the sample examined during the escalation of the conflict. This is consistent with other field studies indicating that outbreaks of hostilities between countries coincide with the adoption of more negative national stereotypes (e.g., Haslam et al., 1992). The current results extend these findings by showing that escalation of a conflict also moves group members away from acknowledging their group's wrongdoings in the past.

A major goal of the current investigation was to clarify the seemingly paradoxical relations between identification with the national group and group-based guilt. On the one hand, identification is a prerequisite for feeling personal responsibility for the in-group's harmful acts. On the other hand, identification leads to viewing the group in the best possible light and hence it is associated with the rejection of group guilt (Doosje et al., 1998).

The solution to this paradox, pursued in this article, is based on integrating insights from several diverse approaches to group identification: the nationalism–patriotism distinction in political psychology (e.g., Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Staub, 1997), the horizontal–vertical collectivism distinction in cross-cultural psychology (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), and the social identity perspective (e.g., Brown, 2000). On the basis of these diverse theoretical perspectives, we suggest a distinction between two modes of identification: glorification and attachment.

The core finding across our studies was that the two partly overlapping modes of identification have opposing relations to reactions to information about group transgressions: Glorification of the in-group is associated with lower feelings of guilt. Attachment to the group is seemingly unrelated to guilt. But when the glorification component is controlled for, attachment is consistently associated with stronger feelings of guilt. Thus it is attachment with low level of glorification—referred here as critical attachment—that is conducive to group-based guilt. These findings were replicated across two phases of the conflict.

In the United States, Schatz et al. (1999) measured this critical mode of identification (i.e., attachment without glorification) directly with items such as "If I criticize the United States, I do so out of love for my country" and "I express my love for America by supporting efforts at positive change." It might be argued that these are compound items that simultaneously probe extent of attachment and willingness to criticize the in-group. We supplement this methodology in two ways. In Study 1 we measured attachment and glorification. Then we isolated attachment without glorification by statistically controlling glorification scores when examining the effects of attachment. In Study 2 we experimentally induced attachment without glorification by focusing the participants' attachment on the way the group should ideally be rather than on the current image they have of the group. Again findings supported our reasoning that it is attachment with low glorification that is most conducive to group-based guilt.

The Role of Exonerating Cognitions

Exonerating cognitions were strongly negatively related to feelings of guilt. This finding is consistent with recent research that has measured or manipulated use of exonerating cognitions, showing their influence on guilt (Miron, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2006). Thus there is growing evidence that such cognitions are related to moral disengagement from immoral acts committed by one's in-group. This finding is of importance because it could point to possible ways to help conflicting groups in their path toward reconciliation. So far little research has been done on resistance to moral disengagement, but an experiment on this topic led to encouraging results: McAlister (2001) showed that hearing brief communications about the meaning of moral disengagement versus communications in support of military action affected opinions about U.S. bombing campaigns in Iraq and Yugoslavia. Thus people can be made aware of the significance of communications that encourage moral disengagement from the in-group's wrongdoings and lead them to greater resistance to accepting acts that conflict with their own moral values.

In our studies, glorification and attachment effects on group-based guilt were mediated by the use of exonerating cognitions. Glorification was positively related to the use of exonerating cognitions. Thus, people who glorify their in-group (e.g., blind patriots, nationalists) can avoid feeling morally responsible for their in-group's wrongdoings because they interpret the harmful events in ways that justify the in-group's actions, just as suggested by Doosje et al. (1998). In contrast, attachment to the in-group does not lead to such group-enhancing cognitions. Attachment (when glorification was controlled for) was correlated to lower justification of the in-group's transgressions. This relationship suggests that those who are cognitively and emotionally involved with their group are to some extent also concerned with its moral standing and are reluctant to justify moral violations on the part of in-group members.

Mapping Glorification and Attachment to Definitions of Identification Stemming From the Social Identity Perspective

The social identity perspective (including social identity theory and self-categorization theory) is the theoretical psychological framework in which group processes are most intensely studied. How does our multidimensional model of identification map with current research in the social identity perspective? Consistent with social identity theory and self-categorization theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1999), we view national identification as a process of depersonalization that emphasizes commonalities among members of a nation and bases connections between individuals on their collective identity rather than on interpersonal ties.

Tajfel (1978) defined social identity as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a group together with the value and emotional significance attached to the membership" (p. 63). This definition has been interpreted as being made up of three aspects—cognitive, affective, and evaluative. There have been many empirical attempts to differentiate these three aspects with variable degrees of success (e.g., Brown & Williams, 1984; Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999; Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-Cardamone, & Crook, 1989; Jackson, 2002; Karasawa, 1991).

In line with social identity theory, we view identification as multifaceted. Our concept of attachment to the group is similar to the cognitive and affective components in Tajfel's (1978) definition. People who are highly attached to their nation attribute high importance to their national identity as part of their self-concept (cognitive aspect), love the group, and wish to contribute to its welfare (the affective component). Our concept of glorification is similar to the evaluative component described by Tajfel because it refers to the belief that one's nation is better and more worthy than other nations. But it also includes allegiance to the group's symbols and authority.

To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has examined the associations of identification and group-based guilt using a multifaceted approach to identification. Studies stemming from the social identity perspective have found, however, that different dimensions of identification are differentially related to attitudes toward the out-group: For example, Ellemers et al. (1999) found that commitment alone was related to in-group favoritism in the context of a laboratory created group. Jackson (2002), examining real-life groups, found that affective ties to the in-group were more strongly correlated to in-group bias than attraction to the in-group and extent of self-categorization. Thus, these studies support our reasoning that distinguishing between different modes of identification is useful in seeking a better understanding of intergroup relations.

Incongruent Patterns of Identification

The positive correlation between glorification and attachment suggests that many people have a congruent pattern of identification with the national group: They are high or low on both attachment and glorification. Indeed, out of the 381 participants in Study 1, 120 were above the median on both modes of identification, and 121 were below the median on both modes of identification. However incongruent patterns of identification are not rare: In our sample 62 participants were above the median on glorification but below the median on attachment, and 61 were below the median on glorification but above the median on attachment.

In this article we have elaborated on the meaning of being attached to the group and yet having low levels of glorification. We now turn to clarifying the meaning of glorifying the group and yet having low attachment to it.

We are not aware of any empirical study that has focused on the characteristics of people with this identification profile. Research on social dilemmas, however, can contribute to its understanding. In an analysis of the prototypical problems of cooperation and competition within and between groups, Bornstein (2003) noted that pride in the group is a public good that is available to all members of a group. Any group member can think that his group is superior to other groups regardless of his willingness to contribute to the group. Bornstein further noted that group members may have an incentive to "free ride" on the contributions of others: They feel proud of the group, without feeling committed to contributing to its welfare. From this perspective, a person who glorifies the group without being attached to it is a free rider: He or she derives a positive social identity from the perceived group superiority without paying the price inherent to a strong commitment to it.

The concept of basking in reflected glory (Cialdini et al., 1976) may exemplify the free rider nature of a person who derives positive identity from an in-group's success without showing consistent attachment to the group. In a series of field studies, Cialdini et al. (1976) showed that some sports fans are happy to support group symbols following their team's success but rescind their identification following the team's failure. Going back to identification with national group, a person who expresses high glorification of the nation accompanied by low attachment can be typified as wishing to benefit from the perceived superiority of the group without being willing to commit to the group. More research is needed to determine the antecedents and consequences of incongruent modes of identification.

Glorification, Attachment, and Moral Outrage

To return to the consequences of the different modes of identification, it is worth inquiring whether glorification and attachment affect only the sense of group-based guilt. How do these two modes of identification relate to emotions toward members of the

in-group who committed moral infractions? We are currently investigating these issues. In our initial study (Klar, Roccas, & Liviatan, 2006), we found results similar in direction to those found in the studies reported here. We presented our Jewish Israeli participants with contrived newspaper headlines (but similar to real events taking place during the armed conflict between Israelis and Palestinians) such as "Israelis [Palestinians] prevented the passage of an ambulance carrying a severely injured woman." We assessed moral outrage directed at the offenders when the same act was committed by the in-group (in one experimental condition) or the out-group (in another experimental condition). Glorification was positively related to moral outrage toward out-group perpetrators and negatively related to moral outrage toward in-group offenders. Attachment, on the other hand, was negatively related to moral outrage toward the out-group perpetrators and positively to the amount of outrage toward in-group perpetrators. Thus, just as guilt about the in-group's wrongdoings has opposite effects, glorification and attachment may have opposite effects in relating to moral outrage toward members of the in-group who acted wrongly. In conclusion, national identification is a multifaceted construct. Although the different modes of identification are highly correlated, they can have opposing relationships with group-related phenomena.

References

Adorno, T., Frankel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D., & Sanford, N. (1950). *The authoritarian personality.* New York: Harper.

Augoustinos, M., & LeCouteur, A. (2004). On whether to apologize to Indigenous Australians: The denial of White guilt. In N. R. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Collective guilt: International perspectives* (pp. 236–261). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bandura, A. (1999). *A social cognitive theory of personality.* In L. Pervin & O. John (Eds.), *Handbook of personality* (2nd ed., pp 154–196). New York: Guilford.

Barkan, S. E., & Snowden, L. S. (2001). *Collective violence.* Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Bar-Tal, D. (1998). Societal beliefs in times of intractable conflict: The Israeli case. *International Journal of Conflict Management, 9,* 22–50.

Bentler, P. M. (2002). *EQS 6 structural equations program manual.* Encino, CA: Multivariate Software.

Bizman, A., Yinon, Y., & Krotman, S. (2001). Group-based emotional distress: An extension of self-discrepancy theory. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27,* 1291–1300.

Bornstein, G. (2003). Intergroup conflict: Individual, group, and collective interests, *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 7,* 129–145.

Branscombe, N. R. (2004). A social psychological process perspective on collective guilt. In N. R. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Collective guilt: International perspectives* (pp. 320–334). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Branscombe, N. R., & Doosje, B. (2004). International perspectives on the experience of collective guilt. In N. R. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Collective guilt: International perspectives* (pp. 3–15). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Branscombe, N. R., Doosje, B., & McGarty, C. (2002). Antecedents and consequences of collective guilt. In D. M. Mackie & E. R. Smith (Eds.), *From prejudice to intergroup emotions: Differentiated reactions to social groups* (pp. 49–66). Philadelphia: Psychology Press.

Branscombe, N. R., & Miron, A. M. (2004). Interpreting the ingroup's negative actions toward another group: Emotional reactions to appraised harm. In L. Z. Tiedens & C. W. Leach (Eds.), *The social life of emotions* (pp. 314–335). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Branscombe, N .R., Slugoski, B., & Kappen, D.M. (2004). The measurement of collective guilt: What it is and what it is not. In N. R. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Collective guilt: International perspectives* (pp. 16–34). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Brown, R. (2000). Social identity theory: Past achievements, current problems and future challenges. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 30,* 745–778.

Brown, R. J., & Williams, J. (1984). Group identification: The same thing to all people? *Human Relations, 37,* 547–564.

Chiou, J. (2001). Horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism among college students in the United States, Taiwan, and Argentina. *Journal of Social Psychology, 141,* 667–678.

Cialdini, R., Borden, R., Thorne, A., Walker, M., Freeman, S., & Sloan, L. (1976). Basking in reflected glory; Three (football) field studies. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34,* 366–375.

Cohen, S. (2001). *States of denial: Knowing about atrocities and suffering.* Cambridge, England: Polity.

Doosje, B., & Branscombe, N. R. (2003). Attributions for the negative historical actions of a group. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 33,* 235–248.

Doosje, B., Branscombe, N. R., Spears, R., & Manstead, A. S. R. (1998). Guilty by association: When one's group has a negative history. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75,* 872–886.

Doosje, B. J., Branscombe, N. R., Spears, R., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2004). Consequences of national ingroup identification for responses to immoral historical events. In N. R. Branscombe & B. J. Doosje (Eds.), *Collective guilt: International perspectives* (pp. 95–111). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Ellemers, N., Kortekaas, P., & Ouwerkerk, J. (1999). Self categorization, commitment to the group and social self esteem as related but distinct aspects of social identity. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 28,* 371–398.

Ganim, A., & Ghanem, A., (2001). *The Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel, 1948–2000: A political study.* New York: State University of New York

Grussendorf, J., McAlister, A., Sandstrom, P., Udd, L., & Morrison, T. C. (2002). Resisting moral disengagement in support for war: Use of the "Peace Test" scale among student groups in 21 nations. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 8,* 73–83.

Haslam, S. A., Turner, J. C., Oakes, P. J., McGarty, C., & Hayes, B. K. (1992). Context dependent variation in social stereotyping 1: The effects of intergroup relations as mediated by social change and frame of reference. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 22,* 3–20.

Herbert, T. L., & Dunkel-Schetter, C. (1992). Negative social reactions to victims: An overview of responses and their determinants. In L. Montada, S. H. Filipp, & M. J. Lerner (Eds.), *Life crises and experiences of loss in adulthood* (pp. 497–518). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Higgins, E. T. (1989). Self-discrepancy theory: What patterns of self-beliefs cause people to suffer? In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 22, pp. 93–136). New York: Academic Press.

Higgins, E. T. (1999). When do self-discrepancies have specific relations to emotions? The second-generation question of Tangney, Niedenthal, Covert, and Barlow (1998). *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77,* 1313–1317.

Hinkle, S., Taylor, L. A., Fox-Cardamone, D. L., & Crook, K. F. (1989). Intragroup identification and intergroup differentiation: A multicomponent approach. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 28,* 305–317.

Iyer, A., Leach, C. W., & Crosby, F. J. (2003). White guilt and racial compensation: The benefits and limits of self-focus. *Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 29,* 117–129.

Jackson, J. W. (2002). Intergroup attitudes as a function of different dimensions of group identification and perceived intergroup conflict. *Self and Identity, 1,* 11–33.

Janis, I. (1982). *Groupthink* (2nd ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Karasawa, M. (1991). Toward an assessment of social identity: The structure of group identification and its effect on in-group evaluations. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 30,* 293–307.

Karasawa, M. (2002). Patriotism, nationalism, and internationalism among Japanese citizens: An etic-emic approach. *Political Psychology, 23,* 645–666.

Klar, Y., Roccas, S., & Liviatan, I. (2006). *When my group is inflicting and is being inflicted pain: Symmetries and asymmetries in perceptions of group-based moral violations.* Manuscript in preparation, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel.

Kosterman, R., & Feshbach, S. (1989). Toward a measure of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes. *Political Psychology, 10,* 257–274.

Landau, J. M. (1993). *The Arab minority in Israel, 1967–1991*. Oxford, England: Claredon Press.

Li, Q., & Brewer, M. B. (2004). What does it mean to be an American? Patriotism, nationalism, and American identity after 9/11. *Political Psychology, 25,* 727–739.

Licata, L., & Klein, O. (2004). Regards croisés sur un passé commun: Anciens colonisés et anciens coloniaux face à l'action belge au Congo [Crossed outlooks on a common past: Former colonized and former colonizers facing the Belgian action in Congo]. In M. Sanchez-Mazas & L. Licata (Eds.), *L'Autre: Regards psychosociaux* (pp. 241–277). Grenoble, France: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble

McAlister, M. (2001). *Epic encounters: Culture, media and U.S. interests in the Middle East, 1945–2000*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Michman, D. (Ed.). (2002). *Remembering the Holocaust in Germany, 1945–2000: German strategies and Jewish responses*. New York: Peter Lang.

Miron, A. M., Branscombe, N. R., & Schmitt, M. T. (2006). Collective guilt as distress over illegitmate intergroup inequality. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 9,* 163–180.

Mummendey, A., Klink, A., Mielke, R., Wenzel, M., & Blanz, M. (1999). Socio-structural characteristics of intergroup relations and identity management strategies: Results from a field study in East Germany. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 29,* 259–285.

Niven, B. (2002). *Facing the Nazi past: United Germany and the legacy of the Third Reich.* New York and London: Routledge.

Opotow, S. (1990). Moral exclusion and injustice: An introduction. *Journal of Social Issues, 46,* 1–20.

Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1990). Involvement and persuasion: Tradition versus integration. *Psychological Bulletin, 107,* 367–374.

Rensmann, L. (2004). Collective guilt, national identity and political processes in contemporary Germany. In N. R. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Collective guilt: International perspectives* (pp. 169–192). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Roccas, S., Sagiv, L., Schwartz, S. H., Halevy, N., & Eidelson, R. (2006). *The nature of identification with groups: Theory and empirical investigations.* Manuscript submitted for publication.

Rouhana, N. N. (1998). Israel and its Arab citizens: Predicaments in the relationship between ethnic states and ethnonational minorities. *Third World Quarterly, 19,* 277–296.

Rouhana, N. N., & Bar-Tal, D. (1998). Psychological dynamics of intractable ethnonational conflicts: The Israeli–Palestinian case. *American Psychologist, 53,* 761–770.

Rutland, A., & Brown, R. (2001). Stereotypes as justifications for prior intergroup discrimination: Studies of Scottish national stereotyping. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 31,* 127–141.

Schatz, R. T., & Staub, E. (1997). Manifestations of blind and constructive patriotism: Personality correlates and individual–group relations. In D. Bar-Tal & E. Staub (Eds.), *Patriotism in the lives of individuals and nations* (pp. 229–245). New York: Nelson-Hall.

Schatz, R. T., Staub, E., & Lavine, H. (1999). On the varieties of national attachment: Blind versus constructive patriotism. *Political Psychology, 20,* 151–174.

Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 25, pp. 1–65). New York: Academic Press.

Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Are there universal aspects in the content and structure of values? *Journal of Social Issues, 50,* 19–45.

Staub, E. (1989). *The roots of evil: The origins of genocide and other group violence.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Staub, E. (1997). Blind versus constructive patriotism: Moving from embeddedness in the group to critical loyalty and action. In D. Bar-Tal & E. Staub (Eds.), *Patriotism in the lives of individuals and nations* (pp. 213–228). New York: Nelson-Hall.

Stephan, W. G., & Renfro, C. L. (2002). The role of threat in intergroup relations. In D. M. Mackie & E. R. Smith (Eds.), *From prejudice to intergroup emotions: Differentiated reactions to social groups* (pp. 191–207). Philadelphia: Psychology Press.

Tajfel, H. (Ed.). (1978). *Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations.* London: Academic Press.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel, (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 33–47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worschel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 7–24). Chicago: Nelson Hall.

Triandis, H. C. (1995). *Individualism and collectivism.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Triandis, H. C., & Gelfand, M. J. (1998). Converging measurement of horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74,* 118–128.

Turner, J. C. (1999). Some current issues in research on social identity and self-categorization theories. In N. Ellemers, R. Spears, & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Social identity: Context, commitment, content* (pp. 6–34). Oxford, England: Blackwell.

Appendix

Measure of Identification With Israel

Mode of identification	Item
Attachment	I love Israel.
Glorification	Other nations can learn a lot from us.
Attachment	Being an Israeli is an important part of my identity.
Glorification	In today's world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the leaders of our nation.
Attachment	It is important to me to contribute to my nation.
Glorification	The IDF is the best army in the world.
Attachment	It is important to me to view myself as an Israeli.
Glorification	One of the important things that we have to teach children is to respect the leaders of our nation.
Attachment	I am strongly committed to my nation.
Glorification	Relative to other nations, we are a very moral nation.
Attachment	It is important to me that everyone will see me as an Israeli.
Glorification	It is disloyal for Israelis to criticize Israel.
Attachment	It is important for me to serve my country.
Glorification	Israel is better than other nations in all respects.
Attachment	When I talk about Israelis I usually say "we" rather than "they."
Glorification	There is generally a good reason for every rule and regulation made by our national authorities.

Note. Items were rated on a scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).
IDF = Israeli Defense Forces.

Received August 4, 2004
Revision received March 15, 2006
Accepted April 2, 2006 ■